How (not) to draw philosophical implications from the cognitive nature of concepts: the case of intentionality by Kazuki Iijima & Koji Ota
PERSPECTIVE ARTICLE
published: 22 July 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00799
How (not) to draw philosophical implications from the
cognitive nature of concepts: the case of intentionality
Kazuki Iijima1,2* and Koji Ota 3
1 Brain Science Institute, Tamagawa University, Tokyo, Japan
2 Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Tokyo, Japan
3 Department of Basic Science, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan
Edited by:
Shira Elqayam, De Montfort
University, UK
Reviewed by:
Maria Olkkonen, University of
Pennsylvania, USA
Joshua Knobe, Yale University, USA
*Correspondence:






Philosophers have often appealed to intuitive judgments in various thought experiments
to support or reject particular theses. Experimental philosophy is an emerging discipline
that examines the cognitive nature of such intuitive judgments. In this paper, we assess
the methodological and epistemological status of experimental philosophy. We focus on
the Knobe effect, in which our intuitive judgment of the intentionality of an action seems
to depend on the perceived moral status of that action. The debate on the philosophical
implications of the Knobe effect has been framed in terms of the distinction between the
competence and performance of the concept of intentionality. Some scholars seem to
suggest that the Knobe effect reﬂects the competence (or otherwise, the performance
error) of the concept of intentionality. However, we argue that these notions are purely
functional and thus do not have philosophical implications, without assuming normativism,
which we see as problematic in a psychological methodology. Finally, focusing on the
gap between competence and rationality, we suggest future directions for experimental
philosophy.
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COMPETENCE AND PERFORMANCE IN EXPERIMENTAL
PHILOSOPHY
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a new research pro-
gram,“experimental philosophy,”which systematically studies the
nature of intuition with psychological methodologies, has become
increasingly popular (Knobe and Nichols, 2008a; Alexander, 2012;
Knobe et al., 2012; Knobe and Nichols, 2013). In this paper, we
consider why philosophical arguments are not informed by the
identiﬁcation of the cognitive natures of philosophical concepts.
In what follows, while we mainly focus on the concept of inten-
tionality, our arguments are generalizable to other concepts, such
as that of free will.
In constructing or criticizing theories, philosophers have
appealed to intuitive judgments in thought experiments, as seen in
discussions of epistemology (Gettier, 1963), philosophy of mind
(Searle, 1980; Chalmers, 1996), philosophy of language (Kripke,
1980), and so on. In doing so, philosophers have appealed to
the fact that their intuitive judgments in thought experiments
reﬂect their own theories. However, experimental philosophy has
found that people’s intuitive judgments are affected by unexpected
factors, beyond those conceived by philosophers.
One famous example is intuitive judgments on the intention-
ality of action (Knobe, 2003). Participants were presented with a
story about a person working in a company. The story indicates
that the person is working on a new business program and knows
that its side effect will harm the environment. However, the per-
son says that he does not care about this outcome and carries out
the program, which leads to the bad side effect (“Harm” condi-
tion). Another version of the story is the same, except that the side
effect of the program is good for the environment (“Help” con-
dition). The participants read one of these stories and were asked
whether the person has intentionally harmed (helped) the envi-
ronment. Surprisingly, a strong asymmetry was found between
the two conditions: most participants in the Harm condition
responded that his action was intentional, while most in the Help
condition replied that it was not intentional, despite the identi-
cal structure of the stories. Thus, people’s intuitive judgments on
the intentionality of an action vary, according to the perceived
harmfulness/helpfulness of the action. It seems that, generally
speaking, we attribute intentionality to harmful or morally bad
side effects. This tendency of attribution is called the “Knobe
effect.”
The Knobe effect may reﬂect the concept of intentionality.
Intentionality attribution, which is the crucial function of our
“theory of mind” (ToM), is partly driven by moral cognition in
nature and is thus the result of the appropriate application of the
concept of intentionality. In this case, the concept of intention-
ality can be regarded as being constituted by moral cognition.
However, the Knobe effect may reﬂect the inappropriate interfer-
ence of moral cognition that is not constitutive of the concept of
intentionality (Nadelhoffer, 2004, 2006). This question about the
nature of the Knobe effect has often been framed in terms of com-
petence and performance. TheKnobe effect reﬂects the competence
of the concept of intentionality (i.e., the core of ToM) or an error
in the performance of it (Alexander, 2012).
The distinction between competence and performance origi-
nates in generative linguistics. Chomsky (1965, p. 3) argues that
competence is linguistic knowledge that is possessed by an ideal
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speaker-listener in a language community. Because the actual lin-
guistic performance is affected by a variety of constraints, such as
memory capacities, attention controls, vocal functions, and so on,
language competence is perfectly reﬂected in performance only in
the idealization of these functions. This distinction has yielded
noteworthy results by factoring out heterogeneous, confounding
factors from the main target of linguistic theories (see discussion
by Jackendoff, 2002).
There is an ongoing debate on how to characterize psycho-
logically the relationships between competence and performance
(Phillips, 2004; Marantz, 2005; Neeleman and van de Koot, 2010;
Phillips and Lewis, 2013). Neeleman and van de Koot (2010)
argue that competence and performance should be understood
as theories of the same language system but at different descriptive
levels. In this case, competence and performance would roughly
correspond to different levels of analysis, i.e., the computational
and algorithmic levels introduced by Marr (1982). However, we
will not discuss this issue further in this paper, and we here-
after use the term competence/performance in Chomsky’s (1965)
original sense, which seems to be dominant in the literature in
experimental philosophy.
The distinction between competence and performance can be
applied to concepts. The Knobe effect may reﬂect the competence
of the concept of intentionality, such that moral cognition under-
lies the application of the concept. For example, Knobe (2006,
p. 226) states that “moral considerations are playing a helpful role
in people’s underlying competence itself.” Otherwise, the Knobe
effect is a sort of performance error, where moral cognition dis-
torts the application of the concept. Generally speaking, when a
judgment involving a concept is affected by some psychological
factor, it may reﬂect the competence of the concept, or it may be
the result of error in its performance.
We can also pose this type of question in relation to many other
studies. For instance, people’s intuitive judgments about free will
have been examined, focusing on whether the concept of free will
is compatiblewith determinism. Some scholars argue that the con-
cept of freewill is compatibilist, since the participants attribute free
will to ﬁctional characters in a deterministic world (Nahmias et al.,
2005). However, other studies suggest that people’s judgments are
sensitive to whether they are presented with abstract or concrete
scenarios. People attribute free will in concrete scenarios much
more than they do in abstract ones (Nichols and Knobe, 2007; cf.
De Brigard et al., 2009; Mandelbaum and Ripley, 2012). Although
thismay be the case, an issue regarding the nature of the concept of
free will remains to be resolved. Even if our attribution of free will
is affected by the perception of concreteness, it is unclear whether
such an effect reﬂects the competence of the concept of free will.
Interestingly, some scholars seem to suggest that the nature
of people’s concepts has philosophical implications. When dis-
cussing how to interpret the Knobe effect, Adams and Steadman
(2004, p. 173) mention the philosophical view that intentionality
does not require intention,which theKnobe effect“maybe taken to
support.” In discussing free will, Nahmias et al. (2006, p. 30)main-
tain that “[b]ecause the free will debate is intimately connected to
ordinary intuitions and beliefs via these values and practices, it
is important that a philosophical theory of free will accounts for
and accords with ordinary people’s understanding of the concept
and their judgments about relevant cases.” In discussing the gen-
eral background of experimental philosophy, Knobe and Nichols
(2008b, p. 12) state, “[m]ore and more, philosophers are coming
to feel that questions about how people ordinarily think have great
philosophical signiﬁcance in their own right.” Indeed, these schol-
ars often seek to grasp the concepts of intentionality and free will
in terms of competence/performance.
Here two questions arise. First, do experimental results, such
as the Knobe effect, reﬂect the competence of the intentional-
ity concept or a mere performance error? Second, how and why
does such an understanding inform philosophical debates about
intentionality? In what follows, we consider these two questions
in turn.
DEVELOPMENTAL AND DISABILITY STUDIES
Practices in linguistics may provide a clue in distinguishing
between competence and performance. In linguistics, when
competing theories possess identical explanatory powers, the
possibility of language acquisition has been successfully used to
constrain the range of theory (Chomsky, 1965; Yang, 2010). More-
over, agrammatism, which is a type of aphasia speciﬁc to syntactic
processing, has been useful in clarifying domain-speciﬁc lin-
guistic competence by dissociating domain-general components
(Friedmann and Grodzinsky, 1997; Kinno et al., 2009). In a sim-
ilar way, developmental and disability studies of the concept of
intentionality may also help us to theorize the nature of the
concept.
First, the cognitive nature of the concept of intentionality may
be clariﬁed by considering developmental studies of the Knobe
effect. According to the experimental study of Leslie et al. (2006a),
children as young as four showed the same tendency as adults.
Moreover, the Knobe effect appeared as soon as the children
learned to understand the concept of “do not care [bad side
effects]” that was included in the experiment’s scenario. These
results suggest that our innate concept of intentionality grows and
ﬁts with the Knobe effect. Segal (2008) argues, “it is difﬁcult to
believe that they learned it from observation of adult patterns of
judgment, or that they inferred it from something else. It looks as
though this is just how FP [folk psychology] grows” (ibid, p. 101).
Thus, the Knobe effect is essentially associated with the concept
of intentionality within ToM and reﬂects the competence of this
concept.
Second, the cognitive nature of the concept of intentional-
ity may be further clariﬁed by considering people with autism
spectrum disorder, who generally show some impairment in the
ToM. On the autism spectrum, adults with Asperger’s syndrome
or high-functioning autism (hereafter, AS/HFA) have no apparent
disabilities in general intelligence and language and can gener-
ally pass a simple false-belief task, which is a simple test of the
ToM. Moreover, with regard to basic moral perception, several
studies have shown that there is no large difference between peo-
ple on the autism spectrum and people with typical development
(Blair, 1996; Grant et al., 2005; Leslie et al., 2006b). People with
AS/HFA have difﬁculties, however, in understanding the mental
states of others in complex situations and in passing higher level
ToM tests, which involve sarcasm, irony, bravado, and the like.
From these observations, it has been suggested that adults with
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AS/HFA use heuristics, which differ from the core of ToM, in order
to understand the minds of others (Happé, 1995; Tager-Flusberg
and Joseph, 2003). Thus, people with AS/HFA have impairments
in the core of the ToM and use speciﬁc heuristics for the attri-
bution of intentionality to complement these impairments, while
their basic moral perceptions are normal.
A hypothesis regarding the Knobe effect in people withAS/HFA
can be derived from these assumptions. If the Knobe effect reﬂects
the competence of the concept of intentionality (i.e., the core of
the ToM), we will not observe it in people with AS/HFA who have
impairments in the core. Otherwise, if the Knobe effect is not a
manifestation of the core of the ToM but is at best only a sign of
heuristics in intentionality attribution, we will observe it in people
with AS/HFA. In the light of the current empirical literature, the
latter possibility is likely. A recent study of the Knobe effect in
the autism spectrum group has revealed that even people with
AS/HFA show the Knobe effect similarly to people with typical
development (Zalla and Leboyer, 2011). Although further studies
were needed, in this case, the Knobe effect would be regarded
as a sign of heuristics in intentionality attribution and therefore
irrelevant to the nature of the concept of intentionality.
As shown above, disability and developmental studies offer us
a theoretical advance in understanding the nature of the Knobe
effect. At the moment, there is conﬂicting evidence from such
studies regarding whether the Knobe effect reﬂects competence.
NORMATIVIST PSYCHOLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL
PHILOSOPHY
Here, we question the implications of the above ﬁndings. What
are the philosophical implications of the fact that the Knobe effect
reﬂects competence or performance error? One related philo-
sophical problem is the relationship between intentionality and
intention. While it seems that intention is required for an action to
be intentional, some philosophers reject this conclusion (cf. Brat-
man, 1984; Adams, 1986). If the Knobe effect exactly reﬂects the
competence of the intentionality concept, then the idea of dis-
connecting intentionality and intention may be supported, since
intentionality could be attributed to the side effects of an action
that were not intended (and such an attribution reﬂects the com-
petence of the concept of intentionality). However, we would like
to point out that an assumption is required for this philosophical
implication.
The assumption is that the distinction between competence
and performance error implies the distinction between the ratio-
nality and irrationality of concepts. Generally speaking, when a
particular intuitive judgment cannot be regarded as rational, a
philosophical argument based on this judgment is not justiﬁed,
even if the intuitive judgment reﬂects the competence of the related
concept. For example, when the Knobe effect does not reﬂect a
rational thought, philosophical arguments on intentionality need
not necessarily take the Knobe effect into account, even if the con-
cept of intentionality is constituted by moral cognition. Here, we
tentatively characterize the rationality of thought, including judg-
ments and reasoning, as the disposition to produce true beliefs.
This type of rationality, which has been regarded as essential in
philosophical discussions, is called epistemic rationality, and it is
distinct from other types of rationality, such as instrumental or
ecological rationality. As long as our main concern is how we
should think about the nature of intentionality, than we do think
about it; there is no reason for philosophical theories to take into
account whether the Knobe effect reﬂects competence, since it
does not guarantee epistemic rationality.
Here, we can follow Elqayam and Evans (2011) in making a dis-
tinction between descriptivism and normativism in psychology. In
general, normativist psychology directly relates competence and
performance error to rational and irrational thought, respectively.
By assuming particular norms, normativist psychology classiﬁes
thoughts as rational or irrational, depending on whether the
nature of the thoughts accords with certain norms, and judges
the distinction between the competence and performance error of
the thoughts. Elqayam and Evans (2011) argue that psychology
should follow linguistics, which adopts descriptivism and pro-
poses a theory regarding the competence of language. In other
words, psychology should dedicate itself to describe competence
in accordance with descriptivism. They claim that psychology may
distinguish competence andperformance, but it should not engage
in judging whether thoughts are rational or irrational. Otherwise,
it draws ought from is, whose inference is generally unsupported.
In the same way, we want to point out that the distinction
between competence and performance error has philosophical
implications, only when we adopt normativism and assume the
following norm: To be rational in the sense of being disposed to
produce true beliefs, thoughts should reﬂect the competence of
concepts. Indeed, if we assume this norm, we obtain the follow-
ing consequence: If the Knobe effect reﬂects competence, it can
be regarded as a rational judgment and thus should be considered
in philosophical arguments. However, we suggest that how we
ought to think about the nature of intentionality has to be distin-
guished from how typically developed people do think about it in
everyday life.
Let us consider the above research on disabilities of the ToM
where people with AS/HFA evince the Knobe effect. From this
fact, we might infer that the Knobe effect reﬂects the heuristics
but not the competence of the concept of intentionality (the core
of the ToM). However, this view alone does not lead to the con-
clusion that the Knobe effect is not a rational judgment. In order
to obtain such a conclusion, we must also assume that judgments
in accordance with the functioning of the core can be regarded
as rational. This assumption is a normative assertion regarding
human thoughts. On what ground do thoughts based on the
core have priority in terms of rationality? The fact that they were
acquired in typical development cannot offer the reason, since the
reason why typical development is directed to rational thought is
questioned here. Whether the Knobe effect reﬂects competence is
not directly relevant to truths about intentionality, since one can-
not infer norms, at least in psychological facts, that make some
judgments rational and others irrational.
Thus, we cannot draw philosophical implications without nor-
mativism, even while we can identify the cognitive concepts
in terms of competence and performance. This requirement of
normativism has not been explicated in the debates within exper-
imental philosophy. While the importance of whether the Knobe
effect reﬂects the competence of the concept of intentionality has
often been suggested, the idea of competence/performance does
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not guarantee anything like (ir)rationality. Notice that this is also
the case in linguistic studies, where the idea of competence is a
kindof biological function,which implies nothing about epistemic
rationality. This is true regardless of the general characterization of
biological functions. Even if our moral cognition has some causal
role in the application of the concept of intentionality or if the
interaction between moral cognition and intentionality attribu-
tion is important for biological adaptation, it has nothing to do
with howoftenwe arrive at the truth about intentionality (cf. Stich,
1990). Therefore, we conclude that there is a large gap between the
idea of competence, which is a kind of biological function, and
(ir)rationality.
CONCLUSIONS
We suggest that it is empirically possible to determine whether
the application of the concept of intentionality reﬂects its com-
petence or error in performance. However, we point out that
this fact about competence/performance does not imply any-
thing positive about the nature of intentionality, contrary to
the assumption made by some scholars in experimental philos-
ophy. Drawing these implications from competence/performance
requires a normativist psychology, which we think is a doubtful
methodology. Thus, we have to bring something from outside psy-
chology to bridge the gap between the competence/performance
and (ir)rationality of concepts. For example, we might suggest
that the concept of intentionality works for social interaction (cf.
Knobe, 2006) and thus that socially admitted norms about its
use should be reﬂected in any theory of intentionality. Other-
wise, we might suggest a constitutive approach in general, which
claims that our intuitions produce conceptual truth “by draw-
ing on constructs such as reﬂective equilibrium and constitutive
norms” (Evans and Elqayam, 2011, p. 283; cf. Thomasson, 2012).
While we do not believe that experimental results do not inform
philosophy, it seems better to explore something beyond the com-
petence/performance of concepts. In any case, we have to be aware
of the gap between how we should think and how we think about
intentionality.
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